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In the mid-1980s, increased judicial interference fomented a
storm tide of director and officer (D&O) liability' that threatened
to erode the business judgment rule's traditional insulation of
corporate decisionmakers. 2 Although the D&O liability and in-
* Mr. Moskowitz, a member of the NewJersey, New York and District of Colum-
bia bars, and Mr. Effross, a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia
bars, practice law with McCarter & English in Newark, New Jersey. The authors
would like to thank the Hon. Joseph E. Irenas of the District Court of New Jersey
for his helpful comments and Lisa A. Chiappetta, Esq. for her assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
I See Michael W. Mitchell, Comment, North Carolina's Statutory Limitation on Direc-
tors' Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 117, 118 (1989) ("The corporate community
has endured a noticeable increase in the number and severity of claims that have
been made against its directors over the last several years.").
2 See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1207-08 (1988)("as a re-
sult of [recent decisions], the almost reflexive deference of courts to boardroom
897
SETON HALL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23:897
surance crisis has not fully abated, the board room has been
shored up by three extrajudicial trends: statutory indemnification
of D&Os, statutory limitation of D&O liability and corporations'
increased use of D&O liability insurance.
This Article analyzes the structure and effect of these safe-
guards, with a particular focus on the incorporation of the first
two into the statutes of New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania and
New York and into the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA).4
I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule creates "a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the ac-
tion taken was in the best interests of the company."' 5 This rule
generally insulates corporate boards from judicial second-
guessing.
6
decisions evaporated"). Cf Joseph E. Irenas & Theodore D. Moskowitz, Indemnifica-
tion of Corporate Officers, Agents, and Directors: Statutory Mandates and Policy Limitations, 7
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 117 (1984) (discussing D&O liability as law began to emerge).
3 See J. Phil Carlton & M. Guy Brooks, III, Corporate Director and Officer Indemnfi-
cation: Alternative Methods For Funding, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 53, 54 (1989)
("Broad indemnification protection is an important factor for a person who is con-
sidering whether to serve as a director or officer of a corporation .... ).
4 A discussion of the effects of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on directors and officers of financial institu-
tions is beyond the scope of this Article.
5 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). See also
Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation at
the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAw. 469, 489 (1990) (discussing Aronson).
6 See Kristin A. Linsley, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A
New Look at Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
527, 527 (1987) (commenting that courts have traditionally declined to review cor-
porate directors' decisions because the "judgment of an informed board is inher-
ently superior to that of a judge viewing a given decision ex post."). The reasoning
behind the business judgment rule is four-fold:
First, by recognizing human fallibility, the rule encourages competent
individuals to assume directorships. Second, the rule recognizes that
business decisions frequently entail risk, and thus provides directors
the broad discretion they need in formulating dynamic and effective
company policy without fear of judicial second-guessing. The rule
"recognizes that shareholders to a very real degree voluntarily under-
take the risk of bad business judgment; investors need not buy stock,
for investment markets offer an array of opportunities less vulnerable
to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers." Third, the rule keeps
courts from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decision-mak-
ing, a task which they are admittedly ill-equipped to handle .... Fi-
nally, the rule ensures that directors rather than shareholders manage
corporations.
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In 1985, however, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Smith v. Van Gorkom 7 severely curtailed directors' decisionmaking
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 6-7 (3d ed. 1989)(quoting Frances T. v. Village Green Own-
ers Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 582 n.14 (Cal. 1986)).
The Second Circuit has recognized the inherent flaw in judicial review of cor-
porate decisions:
[Alfter-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corpo-
rate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate
decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since
business imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on
less than perfect information. The entrepreneur's function is to en-
counter risks and confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the
time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a back-
ground of perfect knowledge.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (conflict of interest, court's ability to
evaluate issues and prospective nature of decision render business judgment rule
inapplicable to recommendation of corporation's special litigation committee not
to bring action against directors), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). See also Interna-
tional Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (1 th Cir. 1989) ("directors are,
in most cases, more qualified to make business decisions than are judges"); Starrels
v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1174 (7th Cir. 1989) ("In the long
run firms are better off when business decisions are made by business specialists,
even granting the inevitable errors."); Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d at 582
n.14 (one justification for business judgment rule is that "directors should be given
wide latitude in their handling of corporate affairs because the hindsight of the
judicial process is an imperfect device for evaluating business decisions"); Kamin v.
American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-11 (1976) ("[t]he directors' room
rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely busi-
ness questions"), aff'd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1st Dept. 1976).
For reasons supporting Block's fourth rationale behind the theory that direc-
tors, and not shareholders, should manage corporations, see Michael P. Dooley &
Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the
Current ALl Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503 (1989), where the authors
comment:
The power to hold to account is the power to interfere and, ulti-
mately, the power to decide. If stockholders are given too easy access
to courts, the effect is to transfer decisionmaking power from the
board to the stockholders or, more realistically, to one or a few stock-
holders whose interests may not coincide with those of the larger
body of stockholders. By limiting judicial review of board decisions,
the business judgment rule preserves the statutory scheme of central-
izing authority in the board of directors. In doing so, it also preserves
the value of centralized decisionmaking for the stockholders and pro-
tects them against unwarranted interference in that process by one of
their number. Although it is customary to think of the business judg-
ment rule as protecting directors from stockholders, it ultimately
serves the more important function of protecting stockholders from
themselves.
Id. at 522.
7 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See also Robert Roy, Annotation, Duty of Corporate
Director to Exercise "Informed" Judgment in Recommending Responses to Merger or Tender
Offer, 46 A.L.R. 4th 821 (1986).
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autonomy. The court concluded that directors should be held to
a standard of gross negligence for purposes of determining
whether a particular business judgment was an informed one.8
Under this standard, the directors of the Trans Union Corpora-
tion paid a $23.5 million settlement for approving a negotiated
merger without sufficient information and deliberation, 9 despite
the absence of any indication that they had been motivated by
bad faith, fraud or self-dealing.' 0 The Delaware court acknowl-
edged in passing that directors in today's corporations will often
be subject to liability in deciding difficult or sensitive issues.'
Van Gorkom and similar decisions' 2 alarmed corporate direc-
tors, who feared that their board memberships would jeopardize
their personal assets. The decision also provoked insurance
companies not only to increase the premiums and exclusions on
their D&O liability policies, but to decrease the policy durations
and their own operation in the area as a whole.' 3 In certain in-
stances, insurers stopped writing D&O policies altogether.' 4
Thus, while the availability of D&O insurance coverage sharply
decreased, the cost of obtaining such coverage soared to record
levels. 15
8 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (footnote omitted). See also Linsley, supra note 6,
at 527 ("[In Van Gorkom], the Delaware Supreme Court blew a hole in the board's
traditional shield, holding that the business judgment rule does not protect direc-
tors from monetary liability for acts of gross negligence.").
9 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876-77.
10 Id. at 873.
1' Id. at 881.
12 See, e.g., Fox v. Chase Manhattan Corp., No. 8192-85 (Del. Ch. Jan. 9, 1986)
(chancery court approved settlement of $32.5 million in personal damages in suit
brought by Chase Manhattan against its own officers and employees).
13 See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 603 (commenting on the D&O insurance
crisis that erupted in the mid-1980s).
14 Id. at 562.
15 See Hanks, supra note 2, at 1208 (noting that D&O insurance may not be prac-
tically available for start-up or smaller companies). One commentator described
the D&O insurance crisis as follows:
For corporate risk managers, the D&O market has become nightmar-
ishly treacherous. Luckier risk managers now face premiums that
range from two to ten times what they were last year. If they aren't so
lucky, they may not be able to find insurance at any price, or they may
be handed a policy so riddled with exclusionary clauses as to be virtu-
ally worthless anyway. And just to keep everyone on their toes, not
only are the once standard three-year policies a thing of the dim and
delightful past, but in this fast-changing, fickle market, even a one
year policy is, as one broker says, "only as good as its cancellation
clause. These days policies are good for 30, 60 or 90 days."
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 603-04 (quoting IPSEN, The Crisis in Directors and Officers
Insurance, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 231 (1985)).
900
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This lack of affordable insurance was aggravated in the
1980s by sharp rises both in takeover activity and in corporate
insolvency.' 6 Because battles for corporate control usually spur a
flurry of litigation by shareholders and others, and virtually any
corporation is susceptible to such battles, litigation under the
federal securities acts' 7 targeted even more corporate decisions
and decision makers. Moreover, the enactment of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1984 (RICO)' 8 ex-
posed D&Os to complex civil litigation in which their boards
could be characterized as "criminal enterprises" and their own
assets could be forfeited.' 9 The United States Supreme Court
recognized the unique potency of this threat when it described
RICO as a "tool for everyday fraud cases brought against
'respected and legitimate enterprises.' "20
In the face of these risks, numerous directors chose to resign
or to decline reelection rather than continue to act for corpora-
tions that could not provide adequate protection (or, in some
cases, any protection at all). 21 Indeed, even those directors who
chose to remain were discouraged from making the kinds of deci-
sions necessary to stimulate corporate growth and prosperity.
22
Increased D&O protection thus became necessary to ensure that
directors would zealously perform their duties, assured that their
corporations would bear the reasonable expenses necessary to
defend the directors' honesty and integrity.
2
16 Hanks, supra note 2, at 1207-08 (observing that corporate takeovers and insol-
vencies have precipitated increased litigation against directors and officers).
17 Wrongful actions taken pursuant to federal securities statutes are typically not
entitled to indemnification because "[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission
has taken the position that indemnification for any liability arising under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., is against public policy." BLOCK ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 583 n.2 (citations omitted).
Generally, "[c]ilaims under the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities acts, under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and under
other statutes such as some antitrust laws [and RICO], are not or may not be in-
demnifiable." WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS § 21.01, at 686 (4th ed. 1988) (footnote omitted).
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
19 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 606 (commenting that corporate directors are
increasingly exposed to RICO liability).
20 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
21 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 606 (positing that a lack of, or inadequate, D&O
insurance could result in an "exodus of talented individuals from corporate ser-
vice") (footnote omitted).
22 See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 118 (noting the stifling effect that corporate di-
rector liability has on director decisionmaking).
23 See Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 343-44 (Del. 1983).
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In a series of developments designed to "encourage initia-
tive in enterprise decisions, encourage qualified persons to serve
as directors, encourage decision-making by independent direc-
tors, and give directors wide latitude in their handling of corpo-
rate affairs,"' 24 however, the storm wall protecting directors and
officers from D&O liability was not only repaired, but strength-
ened. First, legislatures increased the scope of actions for which
corporations could provide indemnification. 25 Second, new stat-
utes authorized or directly imposed limits on D&O liability.26
The majority of these statutes allow a corporation to adopt char-
ter provisions relieving D&Os from personal liability that may
arise from their actions or decisions.27 Third, corporations in-
creasingly explored insurance policy arrangements, captive in-




A. Scope of Indemnification
Until the enactment of recent statutes, those few published
decisions that directly addressed D&O indemnification predi-
cated it on the directors' or officers' establishment of a successful
defense to the underlying claim.29 Some courts additionally re-
quired D&Os to prove that the outcome of the case had somehow
been beneficial to the corporation. 0
Early indemnification statutes reflected both a desire for pre-
24 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 6.03, at 183 (quoting Cramer v. General
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978)). See also Western Fiberglass,
Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34, 38 (Utah App. 1990) ("A fur-
therjustification for indemnity, beyond enhancing the quality of corporate manage-
ment, is to allow and encourage agents to pursue activities on behalf of the
corporation in a manner unfettered by fear of taking good faith risks in the search
for profits.") (quoting Irenas and Moskowitz, supra note 2, at 117).
25 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 608 (stating that one result of the D&O insur-
ance crisis has been legislative action granting corporations wider latitude in pro-
viding indemnification).
26 Id.
27 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 54 n.5 (observing that North Carolina per-
mits "broad indemnification protection against liability and expenses by charter or
bylaw provision or by contract or resolution").
28 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 607-08 (delineating the strategies adopted in
response to the D&O insurance crisis).
29 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 21.01, at 647 (explaining that the com-
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dictability and the trend towards viewing -indemnification as a
"reasonable and normal" part of corporate life.3 l Shortly after
New York enacted the first such indemnification statute in 1941,
all of the remaining states followed.3 2 These statutes were lim-
ited, however, and generally precluded indemnification if a direc-
tor was ultimately found negligent or liable for misconduct in
carrying out a duty to the corporation."3
In 1967, Delaware repealed its previous indemnification stat-
ute and enacted a replacement 34 that would serve as a model for
most modern indemnification statutes .35 The Delaware statute
authorizes a corporation to indemnify any director who has "ac-
ted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in
or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. "'36 This
protection is extended to "any person who is or was serving at
the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or
agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or
other enterprise, '37 if that person "was or is a party or is
threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or
completed action, suit or proceeding.
38
Similarly, the New Jersey statute indemnifies "corporate
agents, ' 39 as well as agents of "other enterprises,"4 thus includ-
ing directors serving as trustees or other fiduciaries for an em-
ployee benefit plan, 41 and those whose liability arises under the
31 See Joseph Warren Bishop Jr., The Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: Indemni-
fication and Insurance, § 6.02, at 4-6 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
32 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 20.04, at 654 (detailing the evolution of
statutory indemnification).
33 44 DEL. LAWS 125 § 1 (1943) & DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1949) (re-
pealed 1967).
34 Compare id. with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
35 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 20.04, at 654.
36 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
37 Id.
38 Id. § 145(b). The New York statute contains almost identical language. See
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993).
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(l)(a) (West 1969 & Supp. 1992) ("Corporate
Agent" is defined to include past and present corporate directors, officers, employ-
ees and agents).
40 Id. § 14A:3-5(1)(b).
41 Other states that have in recent years included similar references are: Califor-
nia, CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 1990); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5
(1990); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-320a (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); Dela-
ware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983 & Supp. 1991); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 415.5 (1985 & Supp. 1992); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.75 (1985);
Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 23-1-37-1 to 23-1-37-15 (1989); Iowa, IOWA CODE
§ 496A.4A (1991); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (1988 & Supp. 1992); Ken-
tucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.026 (Michie 1989); Maryland, MD. CORPS. &
19931 903
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Employment Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).4 ' By
contrast, Pennsylvania's statute refers not to "directors, officers,
employees or agents," but only to "a representative of the
corporation. 43
D&Os that fall within the statutory boundaries can be in-
demnified through mandatory indemnification, permissive in-
demnification or non-exclusionary indemnification permitted by
statute.4
B. Mandatory Indemnification
Indemnification statutes generally provide for mandatory in-
demnification if a party "has been successful on the merits or
otherwise."'" 5 In such a case, D&Os are not required to establish
any of the necessary elements for permissive indemnification,
which include acting in good faith and in a manner reasonably
believed to be in the best interest of the corporation. 6 The
phrase "or otherwise" has been adopted by most states on the
grounds that a director or officer should not be compelled to es-
tablish eligibility for mandatory indemnification on the merits if
she has a valid procedural defense. 7 This broad scope of protec-
tion could possibly allow a director with a successful statute of
limitations defense to be indemnified for conduct that would be
AsS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (1993); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 67
(1992); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 302A.521 (1985 & Supp. 1992); Mississippi,
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-4-8.50 to 79-4-8.58 (1992); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.355 (1991); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (1991); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4.1 (Michie 1983 & Supp. 1992); New York, N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 721 to 726 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993); North Carolina, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-50 to 55-8-57 (1992); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
19.1-91 (1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 § 1031 (1986 & Supp. 1993); Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4.1 (1992); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 47-2-58.1 to 47-2-58.7 (1991); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-18-501 to
48-18-509 (1988 & Supp. 1992); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-696 to 13.1-
704 (Michie 1989).
42 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1741 (1967 & Supp. 1992).
44 See Irenas & Moskowitz, supra note 2, at 118 (discussing different types of
indemnification).
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(4).
46 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 564.
47 Id. at 565 (quoting REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.52 official cmt. at 250
(1984)). See also 1 ERNEST L. FOLK, III ET AL., Folk on the Delaware General Corporation
Law, § 145.4 (3d ed. 1992) ("This avoids forcing on a director or officer (and ulti-
mately on the indemnifying corporation) the additional expense of litigating an is-
sue on the merits where a preliminary technical defense will suffice.") (citation
omitted).
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prohibited by either statute or common law.48 In the past few
years, almost every jurisdiction has adopted the "or otherwise"
phrase rather than requiring an agent to prevail unnecessarily
"on the merits."' 49
The Delaware model permits partial mandatory indemnifica-
tion for a director who is only partially successful.50 In 1986,
New York allowed partial indemnification by deleting the "wholly
successful" requirement in its mandatory provision." The draft-
ers of the Model Act, which still calls for a defendant to be wholly
successful on the merits, noted that "a defendant is 'wholly suc-
cessful' only if the entire proceeding is disposed of on a basis
which involves a finding [of] non-liability.
5 2
Whether the statute empowers a corporation to indemnify
its directors partially, or to indemnify them only if they are
"wholly successful," mandatory indemnification does not apply
at all unless a final judgment has been entered in the director's
favor.53 If the judgment is appealed, indemnification will not be
granted until an appellate decision affirms nonliability.54 A
Pennsylvania federal court has held that a settlement, especially
one in which there is no assumption of director liability, is suffi-
ciently "final" that it clearly satisfies success either on the merits
or otherwise.55
C. Permissive Indemnification
Indemnification statutes also generally provide for permis-
sive indemnification in both third party and derivative suits. Un-
48 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 564-65.
49 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, app. B-2, at 830-33. Only two states, Cali-
fornia and Connecticut, do not include the "or otherwise" language in their stat-
utes. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-320a(11)(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
50 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 565. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1983 &
Supp. 1991) ("To the extent that [the person to be indemnified] has been success-
ful . . . he shall be indemnified .... ); see also Green v. Westcap Corp. of Delaware,
492 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (court allowed corporation to indemnify direc-
tor for successful criminal defense even though related civil litigation was still
pending).
51 Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 7 23(a) (McKinney 1963) with N.Y. Bus CORP.
LAw § 724(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993).
52 REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.52 official cmt. at 250 (1992).
53 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 567.
54 Id.
55 Id. (quoting B&B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787, 789-91 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (applying the Pennsylvania statute which mirrors the Delaware model's
mandatory indemnification provision)). For further discussion of B&B Investment
Club, see Irenas and Moskowitz, supra note 2, at 122.
1993] 905
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like mandatory indemnification, which is automatic, permissive
indemification must be authorized on a per-case basis, and
"[s]uch authorization requires a finding that the [party] has met
the applicable standards of conduct. ' 5 6 The requisite standards
for both third party and derivative suits are separately stated
within each statute, although they are similarly worded.5 7
1. Third Party Actions
In third party actions, indemnification may be authorized if
the director "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the cor-
poration. '5 8 In criminal actions, the director is additionally re-
quired not to have had any "reasonable cause to believe his
conduct was unlawful." 59 Public policy precludes indemnifica-
tion of directors who have engaged in intentional, illegal conduct
or in deliberate violations of federal criminal laws. 60 An action
that has been terminated by judgment, order, settlement, convic-
tion or plea of nolo contendere does not alone create a presump-
tion that the requisite standard of conduct has not been
fulfilled.6' Finally, typical third party provisions empower indem-
nification of judgments, fines, penalties, amounts paid in settle-
ment and reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees. 62
56 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 20.09, at 663.
57 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 567. But see REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.51 (d) (1992) (precluding indemnification in 1) derivative suits in which director
is adjudged liable to corporation, and 2) third-party suits in which director is "ad-
judged liable on the basis that personal benefit was improperly received by him.")
58 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1991). The New York statute
authorizes indemnification for the director who acts "for a purpose which he rea-
sonably believed to be in ... the best interests of the corporation," and then adds
that an action taken on behalf of the corporation but for the service of another
entity (such as another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or employee
benefit plan) need only be "not opposed to . . . the best interests of the corpora-
tion. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993). See also REV.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.51 (a)(2) (1992) (authorizing indemnification for a
director who "reasonably believed: (i) in the case of conduct in [the director's] offi-
cial capacity with the corporation, that his conduct was in [the corporation's] best
interests; and (ii) in all other cases, that his conduct was at least not opposed to [the
corporation's] best interests .... ").
59 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
60 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 20.08, at 661 (footnote omitted).
61 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 722(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(2)(b) (West
1969 & Supp. 1992); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.51(c) (1992).
62 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 722(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(2) (West 1969
& Supp. 1992); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.50(4) & 8.51(a) (1992).
906
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2. Derivative Actions
The standards applicable to third party actions are also rele-
vant in derivative actions, with exceptions that typically prohibit
indemnification of directors "adjudicated liable to the corpora-
tion unless a court, upon application, determines that indemnifi-
cation is appropriate. '63 Before the statutory revisions of the
late 1980s, D&Os could not be indemnified without court ap-
proval when they were "adjudicated to be liable for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of a duty to the corporation. "64 The
amendments deleted the language italicized above, thereby deny-
ing indemnification to D&Os who were "liable to the corpora-
tion" in any way.6 5 The legislative intent of the revision was not
to alter the law substantively, but instead to reconcile the statu-
tory standard with the Delaware Supreme Court decisions that
had required a showing of gross negligence to demonstrate a
breach of the duty of care. 66 Prior to New York's 1986 amend-
ment, its statute did not require an adjudication of liability, but
only a judicial determination that a duty had been breached.67
Until recently, liabilities incurred pursuant to judgments and
settlements of derivative actions were precluded from indemnifi-
cation. 68 This restriction stems from "the belief by many that it
would be circular if funds received by the corporation (the ulti-
mate plaintiff on whose behalf a derivative action is brought)
were simply returned to the defendant director who paid
them."'69 This indemnification in effect "place[s] [the corpora-
tion] in a worse economic position than if it simply had sustained
the loss without the costs of recovery and subsequent
reimbursement."
70
The Delaware statute authorizes indemnification only for ex-
63 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1983 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:3-5(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1993); REV. MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 8.51(d) (1984).
64 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(3) (West
1969) (emphasis added).
65 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(3)
(West Supp. 1992).
66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) official cmt. (Supp. 1988).
67 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993).
68 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 570.
69 Id. (footnote omitted). See also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 122 ("The concern in
requiring or permitting indemnification against settlements and adverse judgments
in derivative suits is its circularity.").
70 James J. Hanks Jr., Director Liability, 2 INSIGHTS 1, 24 (1988).
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penses (including attorneys' fees) incurred in derivative suits. 7I
Over the past few years, however, New Jersey,72 New York,73
Pennsylvania and many other states74 have amended their stat-
utes to allow indemnification ofjudgments and/or settlements in
derivative actions. 75 Jurisdictions are split over whether to au-
thorize such indemnification without court approval.76 For exam-
ple, New York amended its statute in 1986 to permit a
corporation to indemnify D&Os not only for expenses, but also
for settlements in derivative suits for actions taken in good faith,
in the best interests of the corporation, or otherwise "as the
court deems proper.
' 7 7
Beyond permitting the indemnification of defendants in de-
rivative suits, the NewJersey and Pennsylvania statutes also allow
corporations to exceed the derivative suit indemnification limits
specified by the statutes themselves. 7' New Jersey's "non-exclu-
sivity" statute allows indemnification in derivative suits greater
than that provided by the statute, pursuant to a certificate of in-
corporation, bylaw, agreement, vote of shareholders or other-
wise, "including the right to be indemnified against liabilities ...
by or in the right of the corporation. ' 79 The statute prohibits
such indemnification, however, when the director's conduct was a
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1983 & Supp. 1991). In 1986, a proposal to
revise § 145(b) to permit indemnification in derivative suits of judgments and
amounts paid in settlement was denied by the General Corporation Law Section of
the Delaware Bar Association. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 571 n.40.
72 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(8) (West Supp. 1992).
73 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1746(c) (Supp. 1992).
75 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 571 n.40. Several states, other than New Jersey,
New York and Pennsylvania, authorize indemnification of liabilities in derivative
suits: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-005(B)&(D)(3) (1990); California, CAL.
CORP. CODE § 317(c)(1) (1990); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0850(2) (1993);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-856(a)&(b) (Michie 1989); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A) (Supp. 1993); Maryland, MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.
§§ 2-418(b)(l)&(2) (1993); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 67 (1992);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws § 450.1562 (1990); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.521(2) (1985 & Supp. 1993); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.751(2) (1991);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-57(a) (1986); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-19.1-91(2) (1985); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-502 (1988);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1852(15) (1984 & Supp. 1992); and Wyoming,
Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(a) (1986).
76 Id.
77 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 722(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993).
78 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 618. See also Paula Walters, Statutory Indemnifica-
tion and Insurance Provisions for Corporate Directors-to What End?, 38 DRAKE L. REV.
241, 246 (1988-89) (questioning the lack of boundaries in non-exclusive indemnifi-
cation statutes).
79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(8) (West Supp. 1992).
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breach of a duty of loyalty, was taken in bad faith, was a knowing
violation of the law, or resulted in an improper personal
benefit.
80
Pennsylvania's statute allows for similar indemnification, ex-
cept where there is a judicial determination that the director's
action was a result of "willful misconduct or recklessness.""' The
statute also expressly states that indemnification of liabilities in




More generally, statutory non-exclusivity permits corpora-
tions to formulate their own programs for indemnification be-
yond the limitations of the statute.83 A corporate program may
be established pursuant to a certificate of incorporation, share-
holder resolution or an indemnification agreement or contract. 84
Most jurisdictions, including Delaware, New Jersey, New York
and Pennsylvania, have adopted either this approach or a
variation .85
80 Id.
81 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1746(a) & (b) (1967 & Supp. 1992).
82 Id. § 1746(c).
83 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 20.13, at 669.
84 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 580, 616.
85 Id. at 617. Several jurisdictions other than New Jersey, New York, Delaware
and Pennsylvania have adopted some form of non-exclusivity: Alabama, ALA. CODE
§ 10-2A-21 (1975); Arizona, ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005 (1990); Arkansas, ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-26-814, 4-27-850, 4-27-1621 (Michie 1987); District of Columbia,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-304(16) (1981); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-5 (1985 &
Supp. 1992); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.75 (1985); Indiana, IND. CODE
§§ 23-1-37-1 to 23-1-37-15 (1989); Iowa, IowA CODE § 496A.4A (1991); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (1988); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.83 (West
1969 & Supp. 1993); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 719 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1992); Maryland, MD. CORPS. & ASs'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (1993); Massa-
chusetts, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 67 (1992); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 450.1561 to 450.1569 (Callaghan 1990); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-4-
8.50 to 79-4-8.58 (1988); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.355 (1991); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 78.751 (1991); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:5
(1987); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4.1 (Michie 1983 & Supp. 1992);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-51, 55-8-55, 55-8-56 (1990); Ohio, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Anderson 1992); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 1031 (1986 & Supp. 1993); Puerto Rico, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § 1202(10)
(1989); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-2-58.1 to 47-2-58.7 (1991); Ten-
nessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-18.501 to 48-18.509 (1988); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 16-1Oa-841, 16-1Oa-902 (Supp. 1992); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1852(15) (1984); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-696 to 13.1-704 (Michie 1989);
Virgin Islands, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 67a (Supp. 1992); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE § 23B.02.020(ff) (Supp. 1993); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9 (1988);
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Specifically, the Delaware statute, which was one of the first
to utilize non-exclusivity, provides for non-exclusive indemnifica-
tion without any restrictions. 86 The typical statute, however, al-
lows non-exclusive indemnification only to the extent that D&O
conduct falls within certain limits. 87 For example, the New Jersey
statute allows indemnity beyond the minimum statutory cover-
age, but excludes any acts or omissions that are breaches of the
duty of loyalty,88 are taken in bad faith, are a knowing violation of
the law or which result in. improper personal benefit.8 9 Penn-
sylvania bars such indemnification "where the act or failure to act
giving rise to the claim for indemnification is determined by a
court to have constituted willful misconduct or recklessness."90
The RMBCA mandates that indemnification of directors pur-
suant to articles of incorporation, bylaws, resolutions of share-
holders or directors, a contract or otherwise, be "consistent"
with the Act. 9' The Official Comment explains that "consistent"
is not synonymous with "exclusive" and does not prohibit the
amendment of statutory permissive indemnification to
mandatory indemnification, or the use of procedural devices in-
consistent with the statute.92 The former New York statute re-
quired similar consistency, but was amended in 1986 and now
mirrors the Delaware non-exclusivity provision.93 The New York
statute contains limitations similar to those of the New Jersey
statute, 94 but omits the exception involving breaches of the duty
of loyalty.95 The New York statute also includes a limitation for
conduct resulting from active or deliberate dishonesty.96
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 180.0852 (1992); and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1
(1986).
86 DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
87 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 617.
88 An act or omission in breach of a person's duty of loyalty is defined as "an act
or omission which that person knows or believes to be contrary to the best interests
of the corporation or its shareholders in connection with a matter in which he has a
material conflict of interest." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West 1969 & Supp.
1992).
89 Id. § 14A:3-5(8).
9o PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1746(b) (1967 & Supp. 1992).
91 REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.58(a) (1992).
92 Id. § 8.58 official cmt. at 289
93 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 721 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993).
94 For discussion of the New Jersey statute, see supra notes 78-80 and accompa-
nying text.
95 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993).
96 Id.
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E. Advance Payments
Indemnification statutes generally also provide for advance
payments of fees and expenses before the final adjudication of
the litigation.97 Amended statutes have been more lenient in re-
cent years than in the prior decade in authorizing advance pay-
ments.98 Before its 1986 amendment, the Delaware statute
allowed advancement of expenses "as authorized by the board of
directors in the specific case upon receipt of an undertaking[ 99 ]
by or on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount
unless it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be indemni-
fied."' '° The amended statute no longer requires authorization
by the board of directors.10 ' The amendment also provides that
the director repay advance expenses only if there is an ultimate
determination that he is not entitled to indemnification.' 2 The
former statute obligated a director's repayment upon receipt of
the advance payments, but the amendment delays such obliga-
tion until a director's liability is clearly established.
The RMBCA and many states, including, New Jersey, New
York and Pennsylvania, have followed the Delaware model.
0 3
The RMBCA furnishes two additional requirements. First, the
97 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 20.12, at 667.
98 Id. The Official Comment to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
has recognized that:
It is often critically important to a director who is made a party to a
complex proceeding that the corporation he served have power to
make advances for expenses at the beginning of and during the pro-
ceeding. Adequate legal representation and adequate preparation of
a defense may require substantial payments of expenses before a final
determination, and unless the corporation may make advances for ex-
penses, a defendant may be unable to finance his own defense.
REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.53 official cmt. at 284 (1992).
99 The term "undertaking" was defined by a Delaware draftsman as simply "a
promise to repay." See Comment, Law for Sale. A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 883 (1969) (citing interview with Ernest L. Folk).
100 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (1974) (emphasis added).
101 Id. § 145(e) (Supp. 1991).
102 Id. The amended statute states:
Expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred by an officer or director
in defending any.., suit or proceeding may be paid by the corpora-
tion in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceed-
ing upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such director or
officer to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that
he is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation as authorized in
this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
103 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(6) (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 725(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993); PA: CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1745 (Supp.
1992); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac-r §§ 8.53(a)(l)-(3) (1992).
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director receiving the advance payment must provide the corpo-
ration with a writing affirming his good faith belief that his con-
duct fell within the standards of permissive indemnification.
10 4
Second, the facts of the case that are already known must not
establish that indemnification would be prohibited under the
statute. 105
Like the Delaware statute, the New York and Pennsylvania
statutes do not condition advance payment upon stockholder ap-
proval, do not require that the director meet the appropriate
standard of conduct and do not require that the decision to pro-
vide advance payment follow the procedures'0 6 specified for per-
missive indemnification.'0 7 The New Jersey statute also follows
the Delaware model except that it requires the board of directors
to authorize advancement of funds.10 8 In addition, Delaware,
New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania have amended their stat-
utes to allow advancement of expenses on a non-exclusive
basis. 109
III. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
Helpful as they were, statutory indemnification statutes were
flawed in two important respects. First, smaller corporations still
could not afford to indemnify their directors. 1 o Second, indem-
nification statutes did not relieve a director from personal liabil-
ity for a breach of a duty of care, even if the director otherwise
had acted in good faith."' To address these situations, legisla-
tures enacted statutes authorizing corporations to adopt their
own policies limiting or extinguishing the personal liability of di-
104 REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.53(a)(1) (1992).
105 Id. § 8.53(a)(3).
106 Until 1986, the New York statue did require permissive indemnification pro-
cedures to be followed. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(c) (McKinney 1963)
with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 724(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993). For a detailed
discussion of the procedures required for permissive indemnification in New
Jersey, a state which utilizes the basic statutory procedures, see Irenas & Mosko-
witz, supra note 2, at 121-24.
107 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 723(c) & 725(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1745 (1967 & Supp. 1992).
108 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(6) (West 1969 & Supp. 1992).
109 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(8)
(West Supp. 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 721 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1746(a) (Supp. 1992). For a discussion of non-exclusiv-
ity, see supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
I 10 See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 120 ("The ability to provide indemnity does not
solve the problems of the directors at smaller and less capitalized corporations be-
cause those corporations often will be unable to afford the promised indemnity.").
I I I See Linsley, supra note 6, at 528.
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rectors and officers for breaching their duty of care." 12
The Delaware provision'" 3 was enacted as a direct response
to Smith v. Van Gorkom. 1 14 In that case, a corporation's board of
directors approved its sale after a two-hour meeting.1 5 Prior to
the meeting, the directors had not been informed of the purpose
of the meeting; nor had they received in advance any documents
relevant to the sale." t 6 Rather, their decision to approve the
transaction was based solely on the board chairman's twenty-
minute oral presentation and the chief financial officer's report
that the transaction was fair.' 17
Although the court found no proof of bad faith, fraud, self-
dealing or acting in opposition to the corporation's best inter-
ests, it nonetheless determined that the directors had failed to
make a properly informed decision and thus had breached their
duty of care."18 The case was subsequently settled for $23.5
million.' '9
Van Gorkom's emphasis on information over motivation par-
ticularly troubled "outside directors," whose primary interests lie
with other firms and who are not necessarily involved in the day-
to-day management of the corporation. 121 Such directors, to an
even greater extent than those who were more deeply aware of
the corporation's interests, ran the risk of personal liability each
time they made what they believed to be an adequately informed,
good-faith decision. 121
To encourage the participation of outside directors, 122 Dela-
112 Dale A. Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability on
Hostile Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 32 (1989).
113 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1991).
114 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). For further discussion of Smith v. Van Gorkom, see
supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
115 Id. at 869.
116 Id. at 868.
117 Id. at 877.
118 Id. at 890.
119 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 53-54.
120 Linsley, supra note 6, at 531.
121 See Oesterle, supra note 112, at 32-33.
122 There is a general view in all states that outside directors are beneficial to a
corporation:
Delaware's concern over the availability of qualified outside directors
reflects the general view that the presence of outside directors on a
corporate board provides certain protections for the shareholders.
Those who are not involved in the day-to-day management of a cor-
poration are considered better able to take a more dispassionate view
when the board is called on to make a decision. In addition, a direc-
tor's experience in "outside" matters (for instance, as an officer of
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ware in 1986 added a liability limitation provision to its existing
corporate code. 123  Delaware's section 102(7)(b), which has
served as a model for more than thirty other states, 24 authorizes
a corporation to include in its charter, either originally or
another company in the same or a related industry) may be an asset to
the corporation, providing new information and insight to the deci-
sion-making process. More to the point, outside directors are
thought to perform an important monitoring function, checking ac-
tions that may be taken in the interests of management and at the
expense of the corporation and its shareholders. Whether or not
these goals are achieved in practice, the presence of independent di-
rectors at the very least lends an air of legitimacy to corporate
decisions.
Linsley, supra note 6, at 531-32 (footnotes omitted).
123 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 7.01, at 209 (observing that Delaware
added a liability limitation provision because the lack of insurance protection may
deter directors "from making entrepreneurial decisions").
124 Id. § 7.04, at 215. Directorial liability limitation provisions have been promul-
gated in several states. States that have followed the Delaware paradigm include:
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(l)(N) (1989); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-054(A)(9) (1990); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (1987); Colo-
rado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(1)(u) (1990); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-290(c)(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
202(b)(4) (Michie 1989); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 415-58A (1985 & Supp. 1992);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (1980 & Supp. 1992); Iowa. IOWA CODE § 491.5(8)
(1991); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (1988 & Supp. 1992); Kentucky,
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) (Michie 1989); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:24(C)(4) (West 1969 & Supp. 1993); Maryland, MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. §§ 2-104(b)(8) & 2-405.2 (1993); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. L. ch.
156B, § 13(b)(1-1/2) (1992); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1209(c) (1990);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 21-2035(2) (1991); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.037(1) (1991);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:2-7(3) & 14A:6-14(3) (West 1969 & Supp.
1991); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E) (Michie 1983 & Supp. 1992);
New York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 402(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (1990); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 1006(B)(7) (1986 & Supp. 1993); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(a)(6)
(1992); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (1990); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (1991); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-
102(b)(3) (Supp. 1992); Texas, TEX. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 7.06(B) (West
1988); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-1Oa-841 (Supp. 1991); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1989); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23B.02.020(bb)-(fl) (West Supp. 1993). BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 615.
Eight of the above states follow the Delaware model verbatim: Alaska, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma and South Dakota. Id.
A few other states, as well as Kentucky and Virginia, both of which, as noted above,
have also adopted Delaware-like statutes, have taken a more radical approach by
enacting direct legislation which has tightened the standards of directorial culpabil-
ity. See, e.g., Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0831 (West 1993); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West 1978 & Supp. 1992); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(D) (1992). BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 616, 673. These provisions
"authorize individual corporations to 'opt out' of this standard (as opposed to the
Delaware model, which allows corporations to 'opt in') by [adopting a] charter pro-
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through an amendment, a provision limiting or completely elimi-
nating a director's personal liability for a breach of a fiduciary
duty.'2 5 The provision does not take effect unless it is accepted
by the shareholders as an amendment to the corporation's certifi-
cate of incorporation. 
126
The charter provision may be broad enough to eliminate lia-
bility for breaches of a director's duty of care, or may be more
narrow and only serve to limit directorial liability.' 27 In either
case, Delaware's statute precludes limiting or eliminating such li-
ability when a director's conduct was a result of a breach of a
duty of loyalty, was not taken in good faith, involved intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, occurred prior to
the time the charter provisions became effective or resulted in an
improper personal benefit to the director. 28 Furthermore, the
statute does not pertain to liability for violations of federal stat-
utes, such as RICO and the federal securities laws, liabilities for
the payment of unlawful dividends, stock purchases or redemp-
tions, or claims for nonmonetary or equitable relief, such as re-
scission or an injunction.
29
In addition, the Delaware model applies only to directors
and not to officers or other employees or agents.' If a director
is also an officer, he can still be held personally liable for his ac-
tions as an officer, a status not protected by the statute. '3' New
Jersey, however, authorizes a corporation to adopt a charter that
may protect an officer as well as a director from personal liabil-
ity. 1 2 The New Jersey statute also differs from the Delaware
model in that it does not include a specific exception for inten-
vision." Id. at 616, 673-74. For further discussion of specific state approaches, see
id. at 673-88.
125 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1991). See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra
note 17, § 7.04, at 215 (reviewing the Delaware legislation).
126 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 7.04, at 215.
127 Id. at 215-16.
128 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1991).
129 See id.
130 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 614 (citation omitted). This standard has been
said to:
[R]eflect again the limited purpose of the statute to right the balance
and encourage outside directors to serve. It was not felt that the in-
creased perception of risk of personal liability coupled with the un-
availability of D&O insurance were sufficient to cause officers, who
depend upon a corporation for their livelihood, to resign or refuse to
serve.
Id.
131 Oesterle, supra note 112, at 33 n.8.
132 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1990). States other than New
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tional misconduct or unlawful dividends, stock purchases and
redemptions. 
33
The Pennsylvania statute differs slightly from the Delaware
model by providing that a corporation has the power to eliminate
directorial liability, even though this statute makes no specific
reference to a limitation only of directorial liability. 134 Penn-
sylvania allows a corporation to eliminate a director's liability
only if the director's conduct does not entail a breach of a duty
constituting self-dealing, willful misconduct or recklessness. 1
35
Caselaw in this area has focused on excluding directorial
breaches of the duty of loyalty from actions protected by the stat-
utory limitation on liability. 136 Because the duty of loyalty is a
very broad restriction, its breach is a popular allegation among
plaintiffs. For example, in A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clay-
ton & Co., " the Delaware Chancery Court granted a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the defendant company's board from pro-
ceeding with a self-tender offer. 138 In support of its ruling, the
court determined that the defendants' actions were "likely to be
found to constitute a breach of a duty of loyalty."' 39 The court
further noted that a defendant's good faith belief is not enough
to preclude liability when the defendant, by his conduct,
breached his duty of loyalty. 140 In 1989, however, a Delaware
Chancery Court implied that a corporation might amend its cer-
tificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit directorial liability
when a breach of the duty of loyalty occurs, in contrast to section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code.
14 1
The statutory limitation on liability has given state courts the
Jersey that also include officers within the protections of their statutes include Loui-
siana, Maryland and Nevada.
133 See id.
134 See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1741, 1742 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1990)
(referring to a "representative of the corporation").
135 Id. § 1746(b).
136 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 7.04, at 216.
137 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
138 Id. at 107.
139 Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 115.
141 See Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., No. 9477, 1989 WL 48746 (Del. Ch.
May 30, 1989), reprinted in 15 DEL.J. CORP. L. 218 (1990). The court observed that
"at least one scenario (and perhaps others) could plausibly be constructed where
[Tristar's Certificate of Incorporation] would eliminate or limit the liability of Tri-
Star directors for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty - a result proscribed by
§ 102(b)(7). That possibility alone is sufficient to warrant the denial of [Tristar's
motion to dismiss Siegman's derivative suit for failure to state a claim]." Id. at 236.
The court reserved, however, "[any more comprehensive or definitive declaration
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delicate task of defining a director's wrongful conduct. 142 If the
director had a conflict of interest, courts could choose to define
such behavior as a breach of the director's duty of loyalty.1
43
This categorization would remove the director from the protec-
tion of the statute and thereby expose him to the likelihood of
personal liability.' 44 The statute, however, would insulate the di-
rector from liability if his conduct were characterized as a breach
of the duty of care. 14' As a third option, the court could rely on
its equitable powers, such as granting injunctive relief, because
these powers are not restricted by the statutory limitation on
liability. 146
Although in choosing among these approaches to determin-
ing liability a court may be guided by the specific facts of the case,
directors remain caught between the Scylla of "increased per-





Almost every state indemnification statute authorizes a cor-
poration to purchase and maintain some form of D&O liability
insurance.' 4 8 A majority of jurisdictions have followed the Dela-
ware model, which declares: "A corporation shall have the
power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any per-
son who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent . ..
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indem-
nify him against such liability under this section." 149 The Dela-
ware statute encourages corporations to insure their directors
except where prohibited by public policy.' 50 Therefore, Dela-
of the validity of [that provision of the Certificate]" until "a later procedural stage
where the merits may be explored in greater depth than was done here." Id.






148 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, at 688. The only state that does not statuto-
rily authorize D&O liability insurance is Vermont. Id.
149 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
150 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 21.03, at 689 (while the Delaware stat-
ute does not expressly mention public policy, "[firom the language of the statutes
authorizing D&O insurance it appears that public policy would provide the only
restriction on the protection that could be made available by insurance. Generally,
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ware allows corporate insurance funding to offset indemnifica-
tion, but does not allow it to preempt state insurance laws
outlining conduct that is restricted from coverage or limited on
public policy grounds.
15 1
The New York statute authorizes the purchase of insurance
more narrowly than does the Delaware model. 152 Specifically,
the statute approves insurance in "instances in which [D&Os]
may not otherwise be indemnified.., provided the.., insurance
. . . provides, in a manner acceptable to the superintendent of
insurance, for a retention amount and for co-insurance."' 153 The
New York statute excludes insurance coverage of liability pay-
ments of a director who is adjudicated liable and whose actions
were a product of deliberate dishonesty or illegal personal
gain. 154
The New Jersey statute, on the other hand, is more limited
than the Delaware statute because it specifically authorizes a cor-
poration to purchase insurance from, or reinsure insurance
through, an insurer "owned by or otherwise affiliated with the
corporation, whether or not such insurer does business with
other insureds."1
55
Some state statutes specifically refer to the maintenance of
self-insurance or other similar forms of protection. 56 For in-
stance, the Pennsylvania statute provides that a corporation may
"create a fund of any nature, which may, but not need be, under
the control of a trustee, or otherwise secure or insure in any man-
ner its indemnification obligations."15 7
public policy prohibits coverage for willful or intentional wrongdoing, fraud or
knowing violation of law.") (footnote omitted).
151 j. Erik Groves, Comment, Corporate Law and Director Liability: Who's Really Sit-
ting on the Three-Legged Stool and Why North Carolina Should Care, 24 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 141, 160 (1989).
152 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 726 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993).
153 Id. § 726(a)(3).
154 Id. § 726(b)(1).
155 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(9) (West Supp. 1992).
156 See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1746(a) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1992). States with
a similar approach include Arizona, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New
Mexico and Ohio.
157 Id. (emphasis added). See also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1747 (Purdon 1967 &
Supp. 1992) ("Unless otherwise restricted in its bylaws, a business corporation shall
have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of a director or officer
... whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against
that liability under the provisions of this subchapter.").
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B. Insurance Shortcomings and Alternatives
Although broadened statutory indemnification and liability
limitation rights have somewhat alleviated the anxiety of the
1980s' insurance crisis, the insurance problem still has not been
fully resolved. Insurance, When it is actually available, is gener-
ally costly and subject to various exclusions and coverage excep-
tions. 158 A greater amount of coverage is necessary to protect
directorial conduct that is statutorily restricted from protection
or limited by public policy considerations.' 5 9 Specifically, certain
directorial behavior remains completely unprotected because it is
excluded from indemnification statutes 160 or subject to public
policy limitations imposed by federal statutes.) 61 Other insur-
ance problems include a newly installed corporate board's refusal
to authorize indemnification of former directors, 162 and creditors
seizing all corporate assets upon the corporation's declaration of
bankruptcy.16
3
In short, insurance provides D&Os with benefits that they
cannot obtain through indemnification or liability limitation stat-
utes. 6" In the absence of public policy limitations, insurance can
be a director's or officer's only available source of relief when a
corporation is unwilling or unable-legally or financially-to ex-
tend indemnification. 165 Consequently, an increasing number of
today's corporations are exploring indemnification funding alter-
natives as substitutes for traditional commercial insurance cover-
age or as supplements to their existing insurance policies.' 66
Corporations generally employ one or more of these alternatives
in conjunction with corporate charters and bylaws 167 or with sep-
158 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 55.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 59. These restrictions essentially include acts that do not fulfill the "rea-
sonable belief" and "good faith" standards, expenses for directors adjudicated lia-
ble to the corporation and, in some statutes, judgments and amounts paid in
settlement of derivative actions. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 2 1.01, at 686.
161 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 58 n.34.
162 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 584. This possibility is more of a reality today,
especially in situations involving hostile takeovers.
163 Id.
164 Groves, supra note 151, at 160.
165 Id. at 160-61.
166 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 56.
167 Id. at 56-57. More specifically:
[C]orporate charters and bylaws typically provide for indemnification
protection for directors and officers "to the fullest extent authorized
by law." Moreover, these indemnification provisions often attempt to
turn indemnification protection that is permissive under applicable
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arate indemnification contract agreements.1 68
Alternative insurance methods are beneficial when viewed
not simply as another form of indemnification, but as an alterna-
tive form of insurance that is not subject to the same policy re-
strictions that apply to indemnification by statute, charter, bylaw
or contract. 69 Alternative methods include captive insurance
companies, insurance pooling arrangements, trust funds, front-
ing arrangements and self-insurance.
1. Captive Insurance Companies
Captive insurance companies are wholly-owned subsidiaries
that have been established to maintain insurance on behalf of
parent and affiliated companies. 70 Yet, while captive insurance
companies represent an alternate means of obtaining insurance,
these companies may not adequately replace traditional commer-
cial insurance. Captive insurance is generally viewed as a form of
self-insurance because it is usually capitalized by the parent cor-
poration and because there is no risk-sharing between separate
entities.'17  Consequently, captive insurance is often treated as
indemnification, and is therefore subject to the same statutory
and public policy restrictions that apply to indemnification.
7 2
The corporation may also experience tax problems because in-
surance premiums are typically not deductible. 7 To diminish
these pitfalls, commentators have advised corporations to main-
tain a clearly separate corporate status for the subsidiary and to
state law into indemnification protection that is mandatory under a
corporation's governing documents.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
168 Id. at 57. Separate indemnification'agreements are said to:
[O]ffer corporate directors and officers an opportunity to insure that
they have indemnification protection in the form of a direct, bar-
gained-for agreement giving them specific contract rights, which are
enforceable against the corporation if they are involved in litigation.
These specific contract rights should be more reassuring to a corpo-
rate official than mere charter or bylaw indemnity rights. These rights
also should provide greater protection against unilateral corporate ac-
tion rescinding or denying indemnity protection, such as in connec-
tion with a change in control of management of the corporation and/
or the termination of employment of the director or officer.
Id. at 57-58 (footnotes omitted).
169 Id. at 58-59.
170 Id. at 59-60.
171 Id. at 61.
172 For a discussion of these restrictions, see infra notes 176-79 and accompany-
ing text.
173 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 621.
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establish a concrete risk distribution.1
74
2. Insurance Pooling Arrangements
To escape the hazards associated with the captive insurer,
some corporations have explored insurance pooling arrange-
ments (or captive groups) as an alternative to commercial D&O
insurance.t75 Captive groups are composed of separate corpora-
tions that jointly establish an insurance company to provide in-
surance to all the D&Os of the corporations.1 76 Because this
alternative spreads the risk among the various corporations in
the group, it avoids the public policy limitations and tax
problems of the captive insurer. 177 The captive group option,
however, is usually available only to the financially stable corpo-
rations that can afford its high costs. 178 Captive groups also may
be difficult to maintain effectively because consensus may be hard
to reach among a group's constituents.
79
3. Fronting Arrangements
A third alternative to traditional D&O liability insurance is
for a corporation to form a fronting arrangement in connection
with a separate insurance company. 180 In a fronting arrange-
ment, the commercial insurer would issue a typical policy to the
corporation. In return, the corporation or its captive insurer
would either reimburse or reinsure the carrier for some or all of
174 Id. at 622. Recommendations for risk distribution include:
(1) Maintenance of a separate corporate identity for the captive, with a
legitimate business purpose and professional insurance management;
(2) adequate capitalization of the captive in amounts reasonably nec-
essary for reserves and expenses without the necessity of additional
capital from the parent (other than periodic insurance premiums); (3)
provisions for executive management of the captive, independent of
the parent; (4) third-party equity ownership in the captive; (5) compli-
ance with standard industry practices and use of standard policy
forms, but without some of the exclusions added during the recent
insurance crisis; (6) use of reinsurance from established reinsurers, if
possible; (7) maintenance of an arm's length relationship between
parent and captive; and (8) provision of insurance by the captive to
unrelated third parties.
Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 62-63 (footnote omitted).
175 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 623.
176 Id.
177 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 63.
178 Id. at 63-64.
179 Id. at 64.
180 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 19.11, at 638.
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the amount paid in excess of the premium.'"' The carrier would
also be paid a non-refundable fee for agreeing to the fronting
arrangement, and the corporation would be compensated when
premiums exceeded losses.1
8 2
A fronting agreement, however, is subject to the same public
policy restrictions and tax problems as is the captive insurance
approach. 8 3 Indeed, some commentators argue that "instead of
true insurance, a fronting arrangement is merely a mechanism by




As another option, a corporation could create a trust fund
whose trustee is a separate entity, such as a bank. 8  The corpo-
ration would deposit funds in trust, which would be used only to
protect those of its D&Os who are entitled to be indemnified.1
86
The trust agreement would outline the procedures and obliga-
tions of all parties. 8 7 The trust, however, cannot be classified as
insurance because it does not include any risk sharing; therefore,
it suffers the same pitfalls that have been discussed in connection
with other alternatives. 188
5. Self-Insurance
A final alternative, which is frequently employed in conjunc-
tion with commercial insurance, is for a corporation to establish a
self-insurance program. 189 Some corporations fund such a pro-
gram out of the corporation's own cash-flow.' 90 Most corpora-
tions, though, form a separate liability reserve fund that is set
181 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 64.
182 Id.
183 For a discussion of these policy and tax concerns, see supra notes 172-74 and
accompanying text.
184 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 64.
185 Id. at 67. Furthermore, banks can issue irrevocable letters of credit that are
used to pay indemnity claims. This funding device is subject to the same limitations
and problems as a trust fund. The letter of credit, however, may be preferable to
the trust fund because it commits bank assets to pay indemnity claims whether or
not the corporation itself is capable of advancing the money. Id. at 7 1.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 69. For discussion of these pitfalls, see supra notes 172-174 and accom-
panying text.
189 Carlton & Brooks, supra note 3, at 65.
190 Id.
[Vol. 23:897922
DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
aside to pay only indemnity claims.19 l
Self-insurance has historically been viewed as a type of in-
demnification because the risk of loss is borne solely by the cor-
poration. 12 Consequently, self-insurance programs have the
same public policy limitations and tax problems applicable to the
other alternative insurance devices. 193
V. CONCLUSION
The response to court decisions imperiling the assets of cor-
porate directors and officers has been decidedly non-judicial:
New legislation indemnifies D&Os and limits their liability, while
corporations explore emerging alternatives to traditional D&O
insurance. Significantly, non-exclusivity provisions,' 94 charter
option provisions' 95 and alternative insurance devices 96 all per-
mit the corporation to take its own decision-making culture into
account when choosing a policy of indemnification.
Corporations should fully avail themselves of the new safe-
guards 197 emerging in the wake of the D&O liability and insur-
ance crisis. When navigating today's choppy legal waters,
appropriate protection can and should be provided for those at
the corporate helm.
'9' Id.
192 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 19.11, at 640.
193 Id. For a discussion of these limitations and problems, see supra notes 172-
174 and accompanying text. Since 1986, a few states have amended their statutes
to authorize corporations to maintain self-insurance without statutory restrictions.
These states include: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-005(G) & (H) (1990);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(9) (1990); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:83(F) (West 1969 & Supp. 1993); Maryland, MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.
§§ 2-418(k)(2)&(3) (1993); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.752 (1991); NewJersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(9) (West 1969 & Supp. 1991); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-11-4.1(J) (Michie 1983 & Supp. 1991); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.13(E)(7) (Anderson 1992); and Texas, TEX. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 2.02-1(R) (West 1980 & Supp. 1993). BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 620.
194 For a discussion of non-exclusivity provisions, see supra notes 83-96 and ac-
companying text.
195 For a discussion of charter option provisions available to a corporation to
help limit or eliminate directorial liability, see supra notes 123-47 and accompany-
ing text.
196 For a discussion of alternative insurance devices, see supra notes 148-93 and
accompanying text.
197 See E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool
of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAw. 399, 421 (1987) (advis-
ing corporations to take advantage of "the full benefits of the . . . scheme of
protection").
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